The Status of ‘Suicide Attacks’ or ‘Martyrdom Operations’ in the Shariah

Suicide attacks have become a fairly frequent phenomenon today. Many of them are the handiwork of disgruntled Muslim elements. Indeed, in some countries what are known as fidayeen attacks undertaken by Muslim groups have become so common as to pose a major challenge to internal security and peace, emerging as a grave threat to the lives of ordinary citizens. Of these countries, perhaps Pakistan is the most hard-hit by suicide bombings, which now seem to occur there on an almost daily basis, not even sparing Muslims worshipping in mosques. Perhaps nothing worse can be conceived of than Muslims taking the name of Islam to kill innocents and thereby tarnishing the image of Islam.


The issue of whether fidayeen attacks are allowed at all in Islam and of what their status is in the shariah continues to be hotly debated. However, these questions have not received the sort of serious attention that they deserve by the ulema and other Islamic intellectuals. In fact, much effort has been expended by a section of Islamic scholars to seek to provide legitimacy to such attacks by drawing from rules and details contained in the books of medieval fiqh or Muslim jurisprudence. These scholars have, by and large, based their opinion on fidayeen attacks by focusing on the particular case of Palestine, where they believe that such attacks are the last resort by the Palestinian resistance in the face of Israeli barbarism and aggression.


However, now that fidayeen attacks are no longer confined just to Palestine and directed only at Israelis, but have become a global phenomenon, targeting even Muslim countries and Muslim peoples, as in the case of Pakistan, those who sought to provide legitimacy for such actions are faced with a peculiar dilemma. It is true that, prior to the American aggression against Iraq and Afghanistan, fidayeen attacks by Muslim groups were confined only to Palestine. However, continued American imperialist offensives, including America’s unstinting support to the Israeli occupiers, have driven many Muslim youth to the wall, forcing them to take to such radical steps as suicide bombings in utter desperation. This must be recognized as the basic root of the phenomenon of fidayeen attacks by Muslim groups that has now spread out from Palestine to expand to other lands. Ultimately, the dominant Western powers, particularly America, are to blame for this development, which they berate as inhuman and cruel. The fact of the matter is that these bombings are a result of pent-up feelings of revenge in the face of intolerable oppression. At the same time, it must also be recognized that seeking to right wrongs in this manner has led to these Muslim groups exceeding the bounds of Islam and morality. Hence, it is crucial for Islamic scholars to seriously ponder on the legitimacy of suicide bombings in Islam, especially since Muslim groups who engage in such attacks often do so precisely in the name of Islam and claim that in doing so they are acting according to Islamic commandments.


In a range of countries, such as Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and so on, the continuing wave of suicide attacks have not received the approval of any noteworthy Islamic scholar till date. Thus, such attacks in Muslim-majority countries, in which the victims are mostly Muslims, may be clearly said to be un-Islamic, according to the vast majority of the ulema. The case is different, however, in Muslim lands under non-Muslim occupation or with regard to suicide attacks against countries that commit aggression against Muslims and/or Islam. Those ulema who regard such attacks as a legitimate response to aggression and oppression regard them as permissible actions in the course of jihad. They view them as legitimate acts of defence and as a powerful deterrent. For this they use the fiqh principle al-inghimas fi al-aduwwe, which means ‘to enter the ranks of the enemy and attack’ so as to inflict damage on the enemy. They argue that if such actions, which might well cause the death of the attackers themselves, can help to put an end to aggression and war or can serve the larger interests of Islam, they are permissible.


If the death of the attackers is certain, they do not consider such actions as tantamount to suicide, which is sternly forbidden in Islam. To further back their stance, they invoke the fiqh principle according to which if some enemy forces use some Muslims as human shields (tatarus) in such a way that if the enemy is attacked the death of the human shields is also certain, to attack the enemy is permissible if this serves the greater good and the larger purposes of Islam. In such a case, the death of the human shields would be treated as an unavoidable loss.


In contrast, other Islamic scholars regard attacks and bombings by Muslims in which the attackers are certain to lose their lives as wholly illegitimate and even forbidden or haram. Numerous contemporary Saudi ulema, including the late Shaikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Baz, Shaikh Nasiruddin Albani, Shaikh Mohammad Ibn Saleh al-Uthaimeen, Shaikh Saleh al-Fauzan, and the present Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaikh Abdul Aziz Aal-e Shaikh, fall into this category. These ulema regard even such attacks in occupied Palestine as suicide attacks and, hence, as illegitimate in Islam. Obviously, then, fidayeen attacks in other countries, including Muslim countries, would, according to this view, be even more illegitimate. These scholars refer to verses in the Quran and references in the Hadith that clearly declare suicide as haram in order to condemn such attacks as illegitimate in Islam, as for instance, the Quranic commandment ‘make not your own hands contribute to [your] destruction’ (2:195), and the statement of the Prophet, as contained in the Sahih al-Bukhari, according to which what a person uses to kill himself will be used to punish him.


Undeniably, the position of those who declare fidayeen attacks as illegitimate is, on every count, much closer to the Quran and the Hadith and to the spirit of the shariah than those who consider such attacks as permissible. The verses in the Quran and the references in the Hadith that condemn suicide provide clear, direct and obvious arguments (mohkam dala‘il), and the commandment of the shariah in this regard can be easily understood from the ‘direct texts’ (dalat an-nass). In contrast, the position of those who regard such attacks as legitimate is based on arguments that are not absolutely evident. Rather, their arguments are indirect and ambiguous (mutashabeh dala‘il). According to the principles of Muslim jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), such arguments must be interpreted, elaborated upon and clarified in the light of clear, direct and obvious arguments from the scriptures.


In this regard, those who legitimize such attacks seek to draw analogies with cases considered permissible in the books of traditional fiqh, such as entering the ranks of the enemy to destroy them and oneself for the greater good, or inflicting grave damage on the enemy even if this means the loss of life of innocents used by the enemy as human shields. This, however, is not proper or justified. What their supporters hail as ‘martyrdom operations’ and their critics as ‘suicide bombings’ cannot be regarded permissible analogies of these instances described and legitimized in the books of medieval fiqh. Those who enter the ranks of the enemy without caring about their own lives are not killed at their own hands, which is the case in suicide, but, rather, are slain by their enemies. Killing human shields is regarded as permissible in the fiqh tradition only if and when there is no other way out, when the benefit of this course of action is clear and obvious, and when such action is sanctioned by the Imam or leader. For this rule to apply, it is imperative that the Muslims be engaged in a genuine jihad in the path of God (jihad fi sabilillah) for the sake of the protection and promotion of the faith. Such actions are wholly impermissible if committed for communal or worldly purposes. It is obvious that an oppressed people must defend themselves from aggression, but to use the argument that attacking human shields is permissible in order to hit at the enemy in order to legitimize fidayeen attacks is, in general, not permissible, unless, of course, defence against the enemy is not possible without this or if by doing so a greater evil is avoided. As the noted classical Islamic scholar AbuAbdullah al-Qurtubi writes in his book al-Jami‘ li Ahkam al-Quran:


‘Sometimes, the killing of a human shield (tatarus) is permissible […] and this is when the benefit of this action is certain and complete, when it is not possible to attack the aggressor without attacking the human shield, and also when [the benefit of this action] is absolute with regard to the entire community […] Our ulema are unanimous on the legitimacy of this matter, provided that these conditions are met […]’


The stringent conditions that Imam Qurtubi has laid down for the permissibility of killing human shields if this becomes unavoidable in order to take on the aggressor do not appear to apply in the case of present-day fidayeen attacks. However, in defence of such attacks, some scholars and others claim that they are permissible because they are resorted to for noble aims. In response, one can argue that this claim is an obvious contradiction of the fiqh rule: ‘No aim, no matter how lofty, can justify the use of any wrongful means’ (al-ghayatu la tubarrirul wasilah).


In this regard, it is crucial to note that all over the world, including in Palestine, wherever such fidayeen attacks are being undertaken by Muslim groups, generally in the name of Islam, it is the Muslims who suffer the most—not just in terms of loss of life, but also in the form of heightened anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim sentiments which such attacks inevitably provoke. Numerous fidayeen attacks by Palestinian groups in Israel have only made the Israelis even more violent and aggressive, provoking them to stage revenge attacks that have caused the deaths of thousands of innocent Palestinians. In other words, such attacks have proven to be counter-productive from the Muslim point of view.


There is yet another reason why such attacks are impermissible. Those who participate in fidayeen attacks present themselves before other people as ordinary, unarmed people with no violent aim or intention, although they are heavily armed and their sole objective is to inflict violence and cause death and destruction. This is, needless to say, a form of cheating, which is incompatible with Islamic rules governing the conduct of the affairs of war.


In this connection, it is undeniable that contemporary Islamic political thought in general is characterized by great confusion and extremism. The noted Egyptian Islamic scholar, Allama Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who argues that fidayeen attacks in Palestine are legitimate, discusses this aspect of marked imbalance in current Islamic political thought in great detail in his book Min Fiq al-Daulah and recently published book Fiqh al-Jihad (‘Jurisprudence of Jihad’). This imbalance, the lack of proper religious awareness among ongoing Islamic movements and the vast numbers of Muslim youth who are fired by emotionalism make it impossible for fidayeen attacks to abide by the rules and restrictions laid down in the shariah. Thus, numerous Arab ulema who had regarded fidayeen attacks in Palestine as permissible and even considered all Israeli citizens as legitimate targets (harabi or ‘fighter’), when faced with the reality that today more such attacks are occurring in Pakistan than in Palestine, are now loudly condemning such attacks as impermissible ‘strife on earth’ (fasad fi al-arz), which the Quran sternly condemns, and a grave danger to the Muslims themselves.


As regards all matters, including the vexed issue of fidayeen strikes, it is absolutely necessary to consider not just the present context but also present and possible future consequences of actions. Lamentably, our ulema have not devoted any attention at all to developing a ‘fiqh of consequences’ (fiqh ul- ma‘al) and a ‘future-oriented fiqh’ (fiqh al-mustaqbaliyat). However, this is really necessary in order to develop rules and issue fatwas regarding the permissibility or impermissibility of certain actions, keeping in mind their possible consequences.
Seen in this light, one can argue that the fatwas that have been issued in favour of fidayeen attacks, even in the context of Palestine, are wholly incorrect because, as has been indicated above, the radical Muslim movements active today that claim to be engaged in protecting Islam or enforcing the shariah are based not so much on a proper understanding of Islamic teachings as on passion and emotionalism, and a profound and pervasive desire for revenge. They are, in general, ignorant of, or insensitive to, the difference between what is legitimate in Islam and what is not, particularly on issues related to violence. This lamentable state of affairs calls for serious introspection and for a proper ascertainment of methods and priorities on their part.


In actual fact, the opinion of the Saudi ulema who I referred to earlier, who condemn all forms of fidayeen attacks, is the right one and is, I believe, in accordance with the spirit and rules of the shariah.

Muslim Decline and the Responsibilities of the Ulema

The fact of Muslim decline on almost all fronts is one that most Muslims themselves would readily concede. The moral distinctions that once characterised the early Muslims are no more, and the only thing that distinguishes them from others are external markers of religious or communal identity. The ulema once provided moral leadership to Muslim society, playing a central role in its formation and reformation. They were meant to be the true guides of the community, in accordance with the well-known saying of the Prophet Muhammad: ‘The ulema are the inheritors of the prophets’ (al-ulemao warasat al-anbiya). Throughout their history, the Muslim masses have always looked at the ulema to guide them. However, at times when rulers succeeded in co-opting sections of the ulema to justify their oppressive rule, they failed, as a class, to fulfill the duty entrusted to them by the Prophet. This also happened when sections of the ulema fell prey to worldly blandishments and temptations and strayed from the straight path. It cannot be denied, however, that in the early period of Islam the majority of the ulema remained determinedly on the right path and fulfilled their social responsibilities.


Today, the crucial question of what role the ulema should play in the reform of Muslim society remains hotly-debated and is as yet unresolved. In this regard, it is crucial that the ulema turn within and seriously introspect to see how far they have been able to live up to their responsibilities vis-à-vis the wider society.


The ulema have a greater role to play in social reform than other sections of Muslim society and, hence, the need for them to introspect is perhaps greater. After all, according to the Quran and the Hadith, the ulema have been accorded a more important role precisely because of the responsibilities with regard to social affairs that have been entrusted to them. If they shirk these responsibilities they cannot remain in their position and will inevitably be critiqued and even condemned by others, as is common today. The ulema claim that they have been given the role of guiding and leading the Muslim community, and so, if they do not do so in an appropriate manner it is obvious they will lose their relevance and popular support. In countries such as India, the majority of the ulema are economically dependent on the Muslim masses. This further requires that the ulema remain accountable to the latter in terms of fulfilling the roles required of them.


It is undoubtedly true that, in general, the ulema have played, and continue to play, a central role in promoting moral consciousness and religious awareness among the Muslim masses. At the same time, it is also true that, by and large, the ulema have not really lived up to the roles expected of them. Gradually, the ulema in most countries have withdrawn from social affairs. Lacking the appropriate skills and attributes of proper leadership, they are gradually losing the support of the Muslim masses. The ulema regard this as ‘deviation’ and as an ‘un-Islamic’ tendency, while the Muslim masses see the ulema as being concerned solely with rituals and external markers of religious identity and as no different, in terms of morals, from them. Indeed, many ‘ordinary’ Muslims even view the ulema as responsible for a host of ills, wrong interpretations of the religious scriptures.


Two basic pillars of social reform are education and morality. The Quran refers to these two in the following verse:


‘Our Lord! Send amongst them a Messenger of their own, who shall rehearse Thy Signs to them and instruct them in Scripture and Wisdom, and purify them: for Thou art the Exalted in might, the Wise’ (2: 129).


There are different aspects of education, one of which is the transmission of the tradition of Islamic knowledge from one generation to the next. This task has been admirably undertaken by our ulema, who have set up a vast number of madrasas and other Islamic institutions for this purpose.


Another aspect of education is the intellectual formation and development of the community. This is also a task for the ulema, but, particularly after the departure of the British from India in 1947, they have almost wholly ignored it. It does not need to be stressed how crucial the intellectual development of a community is in its overall civilisational progress. A community that fails to keep up at the intellectual level with changing conditions and to keep up with other communities on the intellectual plane will inevitably be pushed to the margins of history. It was the task of the ulema to intellectually train the Muslim community by developing appropriate responses, from within the broader Islamic paradigm, to the changing demands and conditions of the times so as to enable Muslims to progress in an Islamically appropriate manner. Lamentably, however, they have failed to take up this crucial responsibility.


Morality is the underlying spirit and basis of religion. Promoting morality was the main objective of the mission of the prophets. The Prophet Muhammad is said to have remarked: ‘I have been sent to establish the pinnacle of morality’ (bohithto li uttamima husn al-akhlaq). In this regard, it can be said without any hesitation that the ulema have completely ignored the need for the moral development of the Muslim community on several fronts, and the baneful consequences of this, in terms of woeful moral standards, are fully in evidence, among both madrasa-educated Muslims as well as those who have studied in secular institutions. Indeed, so shocking is this lamentable state of affairs that managers of madrasas, who are meant to be the champions of morality, are known to grossly exploit the teachers and staff employed in their institutions, who are their fellow ulema, and, caring nothing for democracy, exercise a dictatorial control over community institutions, treating them as their own private properties. They splurge the money entrusted to them by the community on setting up massive buildings and lavish mosques or squander this money on useless things just for show and fame while caring nothing for the desperately poor people who live in their vicinity. How, then, can people accept to accord such ulema the lofty position of ‘preachers of morality’? Many of the institutions run by the ulema are torn by strife and internal conflict, and characterised by lack of transparency and rules, corruption, nepotism and gross inefficiency. Given this, how can the ulema expect to be respected by the masses? How can the masses consider them as their moral guides?


The basis of social reformation is the moral development of the members of a society. If those who claim to be the custodians or enforcers of morality, as the ulema see themselves, are themselves corrupt, to expect and hope for the community to develop is mere wishful thinking.


Another major drawback of our ulema is their marked tendency to ignore the demands of morality and the true spirit of religion in matters related to relations with other communities. Often, communal prejudices overshadow the demands for morality and justice. Let me explain this with the help of a single case. In 2007, some Hindu policemen deployed in Jamia Nagar, a Muslim-dominated locality in New Delhi, were alleged to have disrespected the Quran. On hearing this, a huge crowd of Muslims gathered at the police station and set it on fire. Several police posts in the vicinity were also attacked. Later, every sensible Islamic scholar learned that the whole incident was the handiwork of some rabble-rousing Muslim elements, and that the policemen had not deliberately treated the Quran with disrespect, as was alleged. However, I myself heard numerous ulema who are supposedly highly respected in Muslim circles saying that while the fault was actually that of the inflamed Muslim youth and not of the policemen, out of political compulsions they must support the former.


This is a brazen case of narrow communal prejudice, so sternly condemned by the Prophet Muhammad, triumphing over morality and justice. It would not be an exaggeration to say that in most matters related to the community, our attitude is deeply coloured by this sort of communal prejudice. One can cite almost very few cases in which our ulema have, in such matters involving Muslims and people of other faiths, abided by the demands of justice, morality and impartiality and have condemned the wrongful actions of their co-religionists.


The ulema claim to be concerned about the reform of Muslim society and often issue statements to that effect. However, their vision of reform is extremely limited—confined simply to purging Muslim society of non-Muslim influences. In actual fact, social reform is far more comprehensive than that. It concerns a channelization of energies at both the individual as well as collective levels for the welfare and progress of all sections of society and for overall peace and justice.


Certain other aspects of the social roles and responsibilities of the ulema, and their negligence thereof, must also be noted. For instance, sections of the ulema are now seeking to play a more prominent role in politics. An unfortunate aspect of this is that all sorts of ulema are now entering the political field, including many who lack the capacity for proper leadership, and some who are corrupt and for whom politics is simply a means to feather their own nests. This has, quite naturally, led to greater confusion and conflict, with many of these ulema indulging in immoral politics that thrive on communal conflict and strife.


Many ulema rather unrealistically expect Muslim society to reform itself simply by delivering long harangues about the need to abide by the laws of the shariah. Clearly, this is inadequate and, indeed, impossible. One cannot expect to change people’s behaviour simply by delivering fatwas on all sorts of matters. The only thing that can be done in this regard is to clarify the shariah position on various issues to those people who are willing to abide by the rules of the shariah. People cannot be forced against their will to do what the shariah expects of them. If the ulema seriously wish that in all matters people abide by the shariah, there is no alternative to gradually working for their intellectual and moral reform. For this, the ulema must be far-sighted, basing their actions and programmes on the future, rather than simply harping on the past. It is not enough for them to constantly dwell, as a means to exhort people to follow the right path, on how wonderful their predecessors were. Rather, their focus must be on the future, and Muslims must be made aware that if they fail to reform they will face a miserable future. This means that the ulema must live in the present, rather than in the past, and must plan for the future. In addition, the ulema must realize that this task is not for them alone to bear, and that they must share this with other sections of Muslim society, with whom they must work in tandem in a mutually respectful and meaningful manner.


In this regard, the issue of reforms in the madrasas, where the ulema are trained, assumes particular urgency. In the past, and even today, many social reformers among the Muslims were produced in the madrasas. The time has now come for the madrasas, particularly the larger ones, to set up specialized departments or centres for social work through which they can train their students, would-be ulema, to engage in social work and activism once they graduate.


Imams of mosques, who have close and daily interaction with the Muslim masses, have a crucial role to play in this task of social reform. Lamentably, however, untrained imams, far from doing anything positive in this regard, often become the cause of greater strife and division among the people. It is thus essential that the imams of mosques be given proper training for their additional role as community leaders. Perhaps the centres of social work that I have suggested that madrasas set up can provide them with the requisite skills. In addition, other Muslim institutions could develop and conduct courses for this purpose.


It is clear—and most Muslims themselves will admit this—that although Muslim society is today desperately in need of reform, the pace of such reform is extremely slow. Among the many reasons for this is the belief shared by many ulema that, as compared to other communities, Muslims are morally and intellectually much better off. Needless to say, this belief is based on an illusory sense of reality. The sooner the ulema realize this the better it would be—for themselves and for the Muslims in general.

The Right Way of Combating Wrong According to the Shariah

‘Enjoining the good and forbidding the wrong’ (amr bi’l ma‘aruf wa nahi an al-munkar) is a crucial Islamic duty binding on all Muslims. Indeed, it is the basis of the distinction that God has bestowed on his true followers as the ‘best ummah’.

Thus, the Quran says:


‘You are the best of peoples evolved for mankind, enjoining what is good and forbidding what is wrong […]’ (3: 110).


Elsewhere, the Quran describes the attributes of the true believers thus:


‘The believers, men and women, are protectors, one of another: they enjoin what is just and forbid what is evil’ (9: 71).


It is but natural, therefore, that, in accordance with this divine injunction, Islamic groups, organizations and movements regard as one of their principal tasks the reform of individuals and society by forbidding what is wrong or evil (munkar).

This is known as tagheer-e munkar in the terminology used by the fuqaha.


This indispensable task of reform by combating munkar has, however, to follow certain rules and principles. If these are not carefully observed, such efforts can, despite the best intentions of those who engage in them, can lead to immense conflict, strife, chaos, and even bloodshed. This is no mere conjecture. The efforts of certain radical movements in various parts of the Muslim world to combat munkar through unwarranted violence and repression have, as is common knowledge, proven entirely counter-productive. These efforts have not made their societies any more good or moral. On the contrary, instead of guiding people on the path of goodness, such a radical approach has led to massive destruction and bloodshed. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this wrong approach to the task of tagheer-e munkar has led, in many cases, to considerable resentment even against Islam, among not just non-Muslims but also several Muslims as well. This has further contributed to strengthening the widespread, though unwarranted, image of Islam as a brutal, intolerant, harsh and repressive religion.


According to a hadith report contained in the Musnad Ahmad and narrated by Adi Ibn Umariah, the Prophet is said to have declared, ‘God does not punish people in general for the [wrong] actions of specific individuals, but if the former see munkar amidst themselves and, despite being capable of stopping them, do not stop them, God subjects to punishment both [those who engage in munkar and those who, witnessing this, remain silent on this] […].’


In other words, Islam does not allow for its followers to remain mute witnesses to munkar, even if this is committed by an individual and does not affect other members of society. This latter is the approach that characterises contemporary Western individualistic philosophies, and has played such havoc in the present-day West, leading to widespread moral crisis.


Islam instructs its followers to seek to reform themselves as well as others, and to seek to combat munkar in themselves, in others and in the wider society as such. Thus, the noted companion of the Prophet Abu Said Khudri reports, in a hadith contained in the Sahih Muslim, that the Prophet said, ‘He among you who sees any munkar should seek to stop it with his hand. If he is not capable of that, he should [seek to stop it] with his tongue. And if he is incapable of even that, he should seek to remove it with his heart. And this is the lowest stage of faith.’


By removing munkar by one’s hand is meant to physically put an end to them. By removing munkar by one’s tongue is to seek to bring about reform through speech. And by opposing munkar by one’s heart is meant to be personally convinced, deep down in one’s own self, that a certain action or behaviour or thought is wrong.


In this above-mentioned hadith report, seeking to combat munkar by one’s hand is considered to be the highest form of faith. Yet, this should not be regarded in a literal sense in all cases. It cannot be said to be a general license for resorting to force or violence to curb munkar, as some radical self-styled Islamists imagine. Rather, the task of tagheer-e munkar is controlled by a number of principles, conditions and rules. After all, tagheer-e munkar is a very sensitive and extremely difficult task. To seek to prevent others from munkar is much more difficult than to exhort people to do good (ma‘aruf). Often, seeking to forcibly stop people from munkar—which is the approach taken by some extremist groups—can lead to an even more delicate, indeed much worse, situation. This is why the ulema have discussed this crucial issue of tagheer-e munkar in great detail, elaborating intricate rules laying down its scope and limits.


Another major subject of considerable debate among the ulema in this regard is the precise class of people among Muslims who are addressed by the above-mentioned hadith with regard to the duty of seeking to combat munkar through ‘the hand’ or, in other words, through physical force. They have also discussed at great length what forms of munkar can, or should, be combated through ‘the tongue’ and ‘the heart’.


In this regard, the noted Spanish Maliki jurist Imam Qurtubi writes in his Al-Jamia’ li Ahkam ul-Quran:


‘According to the ulema, the commandment to enjoin the good [or to combat evil] is the responsibility of the ruler (hakim); to do so by the tongue is the responsibility of the ulema; and to do so by the heart is the responsibility of the ordinary people.’


On the other hand, many ulema are of the view that while using force for enjoining the good and forbidding the evil is the duty of the ruler, the duty of doing so by the tongue is to be shared by both the ulema and ordinary Muslims. This view seems closer to the intention of the above-quoted hadith, for when it says ‘He among you’, it indicates that it is addressed to Muslims in general. At the same time, it appears that those who are capable of using force to enjoin good and combat evil do not enjoy a general permission to do so. Qualifying this right, the noted classical jurists Imam Juwaini and Imam Ghazali argue that ordinary Muslims who do have the capacity to do so can act accordingly only if they do not use violence for this purpose and if their actions do not result in bloodshed and strife (fitna).


Certain crucial question need to be asked in this regard. What are the limits set by the shariah on ordinary Muslims or rulers with regard to combating munkar? When can or should they do so? When are they not permitted to do so? What are the attributes or characteristics of the various forms of munkar that the above-mentioned hadith refers to?


The Conditions for Combatting munkar


The first and most basic condition for combatting munkar is, as is indicated in the above-mentioned hadith report, that the person must have the capacity to do so. If he lacks the physical capacity to combat munkar through his ‘hand’, this duty is not binding on him. Instead, he can seek to combat the same munkar by his ‘tongue’ or his ‘heart’, if he can do so. This is because if he seeks to engage in physically stopping munkar while not possessing the necessary capacity for the purpose, it is doubtful if he can be successful. In fact, his action might have an entirely contradictory effect and prove to be wholly counter-productive.


The second condition for someone to seek to physically or forcibly combat munkar is that the munkar in question be unanimously considered to be something forbidden (haram) in the shariah. In fact, this is the actual meaning of the word munkar, for, as the ulema put it, munkar is something that the shariah recognizes as repulsive, declares as forbidden, and enjoins people to avoid. The shariah considers as munkar something which, if committed, earns God’s anger. However, if the evil is not wholly haram according to the shariah, but, rather, falls in the category of makruh or what is reprehensible or disliked but yet not clearly forbidden, then it is not included in the category of munkar. That is why to abandon actions that are recommended or praiseworthy but not compulsory cannot be considered munkar because the shariah does not regard these actions as compulsory and binding on Muslims. Besides these, all matters that are subject to the ijtihad of the ulema and on which there are differences of opinion among the ulema cannot be considered to be in the category of munkar. In this regard, the noted second generation scholar of Hadith Sufian Sauri remarks,


‘If you see a person committing an act on which there is dispute [among the ulema as to its status ] then you should not seek to stop him.’ Likewise, in his al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair, Imam Suyuti writes, ‘Rebutting munkar will not apply to matters on which there is a dispute [as regards their status, among the ulema]. [Rather,] it will apply to matters on which there is unanimity [among the ulema, as to their status].’


The third condition for combating munkar by one’s hand is that the munkar in question be open and evident (zahir), not hidden. There is a consensus among the ulema that if a certain munkar is not visible to the eye, to seek to forcibly end it in the course of disclosing it is not permitted in the shariah, for engaging in unnecessary curiosity about other’s affairs in clearly forbidden in the Quran, which says :


‘O ye who believe! Avoid suspicion as much [as possible]: for suspicion in some cases is a sin: and spy not on each other, nor speak ill of each other behind their backs.’ (49: 12).


This point is also clear from the above-mentioned hadith, which begins the words ‘He among you who sees any munkar’.


This indicates that the munkar in question must be clearly visible. As a matter of principle, there exists unanimity on the issue that shariah rulings apply to external actions or behaviour, while matters that are not visible are for God to judge. In this regard, Imam Ghazali refers in his Ihya ul-Ulum ud-Din to a case involving Umar, the second Sunni Caliph. Once, as was his habit, Umar went around the town to inspect what was happening, and climbed a wall belonging to a man. Thereupon, he saw the man engaging in a bad deed, and scolded him. The man responded by saying, ‘O Commander of the Faithful! I have committed just one sin, while you have committed three.’ Umar asked the man to explain what he meant. The latter answered, ‘God has forbidden unwarranted curiosity about others, but you engaged in this. God has commanded that we must enter [people’s homes] through their doors, but you came in from the rear. Likewise, God has commanded that we must greet people with “peace” when we enter [their] homes, but you did not wish me in this way.’ Having listened to him, Umar forgave the man after the man repented of his evil deed and expressed remorse.


The fourth, and most crucial, condition for seeking to physically combat munkar is that in doing there is no fear of this leading to an even greater munkar.


Stages in Combatting munkar


Combatting munkar is not simply a question of passing and imposing certain laws and forcing people to abide by them on pain of severe punishment, as some of our ulema and Islamists fondly imagine. Rather, it is a long process, which can go through different stages. There are also different forms and levels that it can take. In his well-known book Amr bi‘l Ma‘aruf wa Nahi an al-Munkar, Allama Ibn Taiymiha explains these forms in considerable detail. His noted disciple Allama Ibn Qayyim elaborates on them as follows:


‘There are four levels of combating munkar. Firstly, when the munkar is uprooted completely and good is established [in its place]. Secondly, when the munkar diminishes although it is not fully extirpated. Thirdly, when the munkar is uprooted but its place is taken by a similar munkar. Fourthly, when the munkar is uprooted but it is replaced by an even bigger munkar.


Then, he adds:
‘The first two levels are permissible. As for the third level or form, it is subject to ijtihad [either to be left alone or else to be combated], while the fourth is forbidden (haram).’


Ibn Qayyim clarifies his argument with the help of an example. Suppose, he says, a person spends his time in wasteful and frivolous activities. If it is known beforehand that by asking him to stop this he will indeed do so, he should be asked to stop, provided, of course, this does not lead him to take engage in an even bigger munkar. If it is known that by giving up a particular munkar he will engage in an even bigger munkar, he should not be prevented from the former, and should, instead, be left to himself. In this regard, Ibn Qayyim approvingly cites the case of his teacher Ibn Taiymiyah, who, he says, once passed by a group of Tartars who were drinking alcohol. Because he did not attempt to stop them from doing so, he was rebuked by some people. Defending himself, Ibn Taimiyah answered, ‘Leave them to their state, so that their attention is diverted from killing and looting the wealth of the people.’
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From this discussion it clearly emerges that while combating munkar—be it at the level of the individual or of society—is a duty binding on all Muslims, it is a task that is to be carefully regulated and conducted according to certain principles, which the ulema have elaborated upon. If these are not observed, even the most well-intentioned efforts to combat munkar can prove entirely counter-productive, leading to widespread chaos and bloodshed, thereby tarnishing the fair name of Islam. The terrifying consequences of the efforts of some ‘Islamic’ movements, both in the past and in the present, to combat munkar through unwarranted violence, oppression and harshness are a chilling reminder in this regard.

The Brutal Consequences of the Misuse of Takfir

The marked tendency of several Islamic groups and movements to resort to takfir or branding other Muslims as apostates, often misusing it as a tool to settle scores with personal or ideological opponents, has had a brutalizing effect on the wider Muslim society. It has contributed in a major way to promoting extremist and exclusivist thinking, and has further widened intra-Muslim divisions and conflicts.


In India, takfiri tendencies are apparent in ongoing and longstanding Deobandi-Barelvi controversies and in harangues between the Ahl-e Hadith, on the one hand, and the Sunni Hanafis, including both the Deobandis and the Barelvis, on the other.

In Pakistan, these conflicts also exist, as do conflicts between Shias and Sunnis, which have assumed violent and very bloody forms in recent years. In that country, sectarian strife has led to bombings of mosques and other religious institutions of rival sects, causing much wanton loss of innocent life. Lamentably, there has been no serious effort in both these countries to bring the ulema and other leaders of these different Muslim sects together to engage in meaningful and productive dialogue.


Fierce sectarian rivalries, instigated by sections of the ulema of different groups, have had a profound effect on relations between ordinary Muslims belonging to different sects. Numerous cases have been reported in India of Barelvi Muslims forbidding Deobandi Muslims from mosques controlled by them. In some cases, Deobandis who enter Barelvi-controlled mosques are forcibly expelled from them, after which the mosques have to be ‘cleaned’ in order to ‘purify’ them. Recently, a case was reported from Moradabad, in which when some Barelvi men prayed behind a Deobandi imam at a funeral service, a Barelvi maulvi issued a fatwa declaring the marriage of these men to their wives to have been annulled thereby, because, the Barelvi maulvi argued, by praying behind a Deobandi they had ceased to be Muslims and so could not be married to Muslim women. According to this Barelvi maulvi, Deobandis are not Muslims at all, but are, actually, kafirs. This is a widely-shared view among the Barelvis.


The mass media, ever on the prowl for sensational news about Muslims, routinely highlight such cases in their reporting—with unconcealed glee. Obviously, such cases of naked obscurantism prove a blessing, and also a source of perverse amusement, for elements that thrive on mocking the shariah and the ulema. Further dividing Muslims among themselves and playing into the hands of those who miss no opportunity to mock Islam are thus among the most alarming consequences of the wielding of the sword of takfir.

In some Muslim countries, violent groups have resorted to takfir to engage in war against their own governments. These groups brand their governments as ‘agents of the West’, and, on that basis, declare them to be ‘kafir governments’ against which armed jihad is, so they claim, a binding religious duty. This obviously never-ending war, needless to say, is only leading to the further destruction of Muslim countries, besides further tarnishing the image of Islam and Muslims in the eyes of others.


Given the bloody and devastating consequences of takfiri tendencies, how should we Muslims, seriously committed to our faith and our people, seek to combat them? This is a critical issue, for which we must seek guidance from the Quran and the practice of the Prophet.


In this regard, it is pertinent to note what the Prophet’s own stance was on the matter. In a well-known hadith contained in the Sahih al-Bukhari, the Prophet declared, ‘ [if someone] engages in takfir of a true believer, it is as if he has killed him’. He also said, ‘If someone calls his brother (fellow Muslim) a kafir, then either of them is a kafir.’


On this issue, the noted classical Islamic scholar Imam Ghazali writes in his acclaimed Faisal al-Tafriqa Bayn al-Islam wa al-Zandaqa (‘The Decision Regarding the Difference Between Islam and Disbelief’):


‘The basis of faith are three: faith in God; faith in the Prophet; and faith in the Hereafter. Besides this, [all else] are minor branches (fur‘u). One should know that takfir [of anyone] cannot be engaged in on the basis of the minor branches except in one matter, and that is if a person denies any aspect of the principles of religion (usul ud-din) that has been continuously transmitted from the Prophet.’


In the same book, Imam Ghazali argues that there is danger in engaging in takfir, while there is no danger in ‘remaining silent’—that is to say, in refraining from engaging in takfir of others. In another of his works, titled Al-Iqtisad fi al-Itiqad (‘The Moderate Position in Matters of Faith’), Imam Ghazali contends, ‘To mistakenly release a thousand infidels is a lighter [sin] than to spill the blood of a single Muslim.’ In a similar vein, Allama Taftazani, another accomplished classical Islamic scholar, explains in his Sharh ul-‘Aqaid al-Nasafiya a basic principle of the Sunni school, according to which one should not engage in takfir against any person from among the ahl-e qibla, that is people who pray in the direction of the Ka‘aba—which is to say, any Muslim. The well-known Hanafi text Sharh Mawaqif relates that Imam Abu Hanifa, putative founder of the Hanafi school, never engaged in takfir against any one belonging to the ahl-e qibla. The Imam is also said to have opined, ‘If there are 99 reasons to declare a person a kafir and only reason not to do so, takfir shall not be engaged in against him.’ Likewise, another noted classical Islamic scholar, Allama Tajuddin Subqi, argued, ‘Till such time as a person believes that there is no god but God and [that] Muhammad is the prophet of God, it is difficult to engage in takfir against him.’


According to the noted Indian Deobandi scholar Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, a leading ‘alim of the Deoband school Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, was of the view that even if there are 999 aspects of kufr in a person from among the ahl-e qibla, takfir should not be engaged in against him. Yet, despite this clear stand, some Deobandi ulema have committed enormous blunders, not sparing noted Islamic scholars such as Maulana Hamiduddin Farahi and Maulana Shibli Numani from the unsheathed sword of takfir.


The attitude and behaviour of the ulema of the Barelvi school is even more extreme in this regard. They openly declare all Deobandis and followers of the Ahl-e Hadith sect to be kafirs. The leading light of the Barelvi sect, Ahmad Riza Khan Barelvi, issued a fatwa claiming that if any person even doubts the ‘infidelity’ of the Deobandis, he, too, is a kafir. He was of the view that all Deobandis were kafir in the full sense of the term. Accordingly, in various fatwas he argued that Barelvis must desist from treating them as fellow Muslims in any manner whatsoever.


From all these details, it is amply clear that takfiri tendencies have today become a deadly disease that is eating away at the very vitals of Muslim society. It has divided the entire Muslim society against itself. It has also given a tremendous boost to extremism in influential Muslim religious and political circles. It has thus now become imperative for Muslims seriously concerned about and committed to their faith to deal with this monster, and to seriously work together to seek a solution to this menace.